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1. Introduction
In the twenty-ﬁrst century, universal basic education (UBE) is
widely recognized as a global human right as enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), and
major international conferences held in Jomtien (1990) and Dakar
(2000) promoting ‘‘Education for All’’ (EFA). UBE is a cornerstone of
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2013a), but as of
2013 only two out of nine global developing regions identiﬁed by
the UN were on track to achieve UBE by 2015 (UN, 2013b).
Whereas historically countries have taken several generations
to universalize basic education (Benavot and Resnik, 2006; Dickson
et al., 2010; Hughes and Irfan, 2010), the MDGs endeavored to
rapidly implement global primary education within the space of
just ﬁfteen years. Such a rapid expansion of schooling systems is
unprecedented in world history leaving us with the puzzle of how
to achieve UBE in such a short time frame?
One possible strategy is to focus on the private sector as a route
to universal basic education (Andrabi et al., 2015; Das and Khwaja,
2015; Tooley, 2009; Tooley and Dixon, 2007; Tulloch et al., 2014;
Kramer and Overbey, 2014), an approach promoted by many
international organizations and transnational advocacy networks
(Collins and Wiseman, 2012; Nambissan and Ball, 2010). Yet some
argue heavy reliance on the private sector will fail to meet the
schooling needs of rural areas, marginalized groups, and the ultra-
poor (Lewin, 2007). An alternative strategy is to rely on national
public school systems to enroll all or most children of school age
(Kosack, 2012; Weiner, 1991).
Since Dakar, however, the global education for development
agenda has clouded the lines between pro-private and pro-public
approaches. In the early 21st century an international compact or
‘‘third way’’ was established between proponents of private
schooling and their skeptics (Daun and Mundy, 2011; The´rien,
2002; Ruggie, 2003) whereby ‘‘the Breton Woods institutions
[World Bank and International Monetary Fund] now address
poverty and equity issues regularly, while the UN organizations are
less skeptical of the role of the market and private sector in
development’’ (Mundy, 2006, p. 29). According to the Dakar Forum
on EFA, the ‘‘third way’’ includes private schooling as a comple-
ment to public schooling to supply the ever increasing demand for
education (Kitaev, 2004). Emerging from this agenda is a blueprint
for ‘‘ideal’’ governance involving public-private partnerships,
increased school choice, decentralization, reduced unit costs,
and an increase in the use of standardized tests (Daun and Mundy,
2011; Mundy, 2006). Despite the seeming incursion of privatiza-
tion into the education for development framework, private school
proponents, such as Tooley and Dixon (2006, 2007), believe that
underlying biases against private schools limit their incorporation
into MDG goals.
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Others vehemently disagree, pointing out that the present
global compact is spurred by policy frames that provide simplistic
solutions largely limiting policy options to those neo-liberal in
orientation (Srivastava, 2010a), that privatization has been the
focus of international education policy since the 1990s (Rose,
2005), and that the goals of the present agenda parallel those of the
Washington Consensus (Mundy, 2005). During this period of
convergence between public and private approaches, we feel it is
important to ask which approach is likely to lead to faster
implementation of UBE.
The goal of this paper is to address this question. Beginning with
a literature review on the implementation of UBE, we contrast
approaches emphasizing a mixture of private and public schooling
with the more traditional approach emphasizing exclusively or
primarily ‘‘public’’ schooling which we deﬁne as over 90% of
school-age children attending elementary schools managed by
local or national governments1. We then analyze major trends in
the educational development of two countries pivotal to UBE
because of their very large populations: China and India. As
discussed below, we ﬁnd the public school route taken by China
linked to faster implementation of basic education, higher levels of
school attendance, and higher levels of gender parity than the
mixed approach followed by India.
1.1. Literature review and hypotheses
Scholars have analyzed universal basic education, a term
referring to the completion of primary and lower secondary
schooling2, from normative, historical, and public policy
approaches. Often known as ‘‘compulsory education’’ (Bloom,
2006; Weiner, 1991), basic education in most countries comprises
the ﬁrst eight to nine years of a person’s formal education. UBE is
highly valued because of its beneﬁts to individuals and society.
First, the economic returns to primary education are positive and
higher than returns to secondary and higher education (Tilak,
2001). Primary schooling is the ﬁrst step on the formal education
ladder and helps develop individuals’ skills, values, general
knowledge, and socialization. Basic education has positive impacts
on health and accelerates the demographic transition toward
lower fertility (Baker et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012). It is likewise a
means to promote tolerance and national cohesion as people with
more formal education have greater social mobility, make better
civil servants, and tend to be more politically active. In addition,
mass education leads to dramatic improvements in agriculture,
infrastructure, economic productivity, social services, and tech-
nology (Lutz and Samir, 2011). By contrast, the costs to society of
low education include high unemployment, crime, civil conﬂict,
drug abuse, violence, poor health, lost government revenue, lost
income, and high costs of public assistance (Belﬁeld and Levin,
2007).
Historically, most industrialized countries universalized basic
education over multiple decades through the use of public
schooling systems as the exclusive or predominant provider of
basic education (Benavot and Resnik, 2006; Lewin, 2007). The
primary argument in favor of encompassing public school systems
is that the state is the only organization in society with the capacity
and incentive to provide sufﬁcient education resources, equalize
opportunities, build national cohesion, and hold parents account-
able for their children’s truancy (Weiner, 1991).
Mehrotra (1998) case studies of 10 high-achieving developing
countries (countries that were successful in rapidly expanding
UBE and reaching gender parity early in their development
process) likewise support the role of government schooling as
vital to UBE. He identiﬁes ﬁve key factors that aid developing
countries in expanding their enrollment. First, in each successful
country the government operated basic social services, including
health sector interventions to ensure adequate nutrition as well
as policies that promoted the agency of women. Second, primary
education was seen and treated as a responsibility of the state. In
nine out of ten successful countries, the share of pupils enrolled
in a private primary school was less than 10% in 1975, and for
some countries, such as South Korea (1%) and Cuba (0%), the
private sector was basically non-existent. Third, successful
countries spent more on education compared to their regional
average and this expenditure was targeted on primary education.
Another study similarly found that in Malawi and Uganda
enrollment rates rose sharply once the state took responsibility
for free primary education and increased its share of education
spending (Lincove, 2007). Targeting spending toward primary
education and away from higher education (which often provides
only for a select, already highly privileged group in developing
countries) is essential to meeting UBE (Smith, 2011). For
example, higher education spending as a multiple of per pupil
expenditure for primary education in high achieving countries
like Botswana (40), Mauritius (22), and Zimbabwe (17) was well
below the average of 62 for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1980
(Mehrotra, 1998). Fourth, successful countries maintained lower
unit costs by allocating a lower portion of education expenditure
to teacher salaries and by keeping repetition rates low. This
enabled high achieving countries, such as South Korea and
Malaysia, to spend a greater amount on teaching materials,
relative to lower achieving peers (i.e. India). Finally, nine out of
ten successful countries had no direct tuition costs for primary
education, leading Mehrotra (1998) to conclude that ‘‘the
reduction of costs to parents of sending children to school
seems to have been a primary reason for the rapid expansion of
primary enrollment in the selected countries’’ (p. 478). Elimina-
tion of tuition fees also led to greater gender parity as parents did
not have to choose between sending their son or daughter to
school. Furthermore, the introduction or re-introduction of
schools fees in Sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in decreased
primary school enrollment without improving education quality
(Iscan et al., 2015).
Although most countries successful in attaining UBE have relied
primarily on government schooling, in recent years there has been
an increase in ‘‘private schooling,’’ which we deﬁne as schools
managed by a non-government entity, irrespective of ﬁnancing
source, and irrespective of whether the school is for-proﬁt or non-
proﬁt. Similarly, Kitaev (1999) identiﬁes ‘‘private schools’’ as ‘‘all
formal schools that are not public, and may be founded, owned,
managed, and ﬁnanced by actors other than the state, even in cases
where the state provides most of its funding and has considerable
control over these schools’’ (p. 43). While some may describe
schools which are regulated by the state, receive most of its
funding from a general tax base, and face restrictions on its proﬁts
as ‘public systems with subcontracting,’ we deﬁne public
(government) and private (non-government) schools following
the Indian government’s education ministry whereby ‘‘govern-
ment’’ schools are those managed by central and state govern-
ments, panchayats, municipalities, cantonment boards, and town
area committees (MHRD, 2014a). Private schools are divided into
two categories: ‘‘private aided’’ schools ‘‘managed by an individual,
trust, society or other private organization and receiving regular
maintenance grant from Government or local body,’’ and ‘‘private-
unaided’’ schools ‘‘managed by an individual, trust, society or other
1 We deﬁne as ‘‘public", schooling which is provided and managed by any level of
government including not only central and provincial levels, but also municipal and
village level governments. By contrast, we treat ‘‘private" schooling as that which is
not provided by government even if it may receive funds from the government.
2 We deﬁne ‘‘universalization of basic education" as completion of elementary
education operationalized as graduation rates or completion rates minus dropouts.
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private organization and not receiving regular maintenance grant
from Government or local body’’ (MHRD, 2014a, p. i).
Over the past thirty years, evidence of privatization is visible in
the global reduction of state responsibility (Mok, 1999) as globally
private school enrollment at the primary level increased by 58%
between 1991 and 2004 (Patrinos et al., 2009). Examples of
widespread privatization reforms include vouchers in Latin
America (Bonal, 2004; Carnoy, 1998), private tutoring worldwide
(Baker et al., 2001; Bray and Lykins, 2012) and especially in East
Asia (Bray, 2006; Dang, 2007; Xue and Ding, 2009), public-private
partnerships in India (Srivastava, 2010b), low-fee private schools
(LFPs) in parts of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Andrabi et al.,
2008; Aslam, 2009; Ha¨rma¨, 2009; Srivastava, 2007; Tooley, 2007;
Tooley and Dixon, 2006) and the introduction of user fees in places
like China and Hong Kong (Mok, 1999).
Proponents of privatization argue this increases access and
quality through generating public savings by encouraging those
who are able, to exit the system. Public capital can then be
reallocated to increase the scale of primary education to include
those previously lacking the opportunity to attend school
(Colclough, 1996). Another claim is that privatization may
expand access to areas where no public schools are present or
where government support is not feasible (Lincove, 2009;
Robeyns, 2006). Such neo-liberal ideas have been backed by
many international donor agencies who view private schooling
as a catalyst in implementing UBE (Nambissan and Ball, 2010).
Arguably, one such organization is the World Bank, a key player
in international education and MDG strategies through its active
role in disseminating loans, grants, research, publications, and
policy advice (Arnove et al., 2003; Joshi and O’Dell, 2013). For
example, Lincove (2009) found that half of the 52 education
projects funded by the Bank between 2002 and 2004 included
neo-liberal reforms as a condition of the loan. Likewise recent
analysis of the World Bank’s (2011) education sector strategy
failed to ﬁnd a substantial shift in neo-liberal rhetoric compared
to its previous strategy in 1999 (Joshi and Smith, 2012). After
reviewing the World Bank’s spending portfolio, however, Mundy
and Menashy (2012) concluded that the Bank’s rhetoric does not
necessarily equate to greater ﬁnancial support for the private
sector. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the
discourse of the World Bank has served to ideologically
legitimize the role of privatization in UBE (Ilon, 2002; Kane,
2008; Robertson, 2012).
Turning our attention from theoretical arguments to empirical
evidence, the Chilean voucher system has been one of the most
widely studied education reforms emphasizing a strong role for the
private sector in elementary education. Studying the voucher
system between 1989 and 2000, Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein
(2002) found increases in student attendance as well as resources
dedicated to education. Net total enrollment of 6 to 13 year olds
increased to 98%, most of which was accounted for by increased
participation of the private sector which in 2000 enrolled 45% of all
students. Bettinger (2006), however, found mixed evidence from
the voucher system where reductions in repetition rates could not
be deﬁnitively linked to voucher incentives. The expansion of
privatization and increased user fees in Chile has also met with
much dissatisfaction among certain social groups leading to
widespread student movements and civil unrest in 2011 (Salinas
and Fraser, 2012).
Supporters of privatization assert that, when set at the proper
price-point, private schools in the form of low-fee private (LFP)
schools can potentially make progress in UBE and have done so in
countries such as India, Pakistan, and Nigeria (Tooley and Dixon,
2007). For example, the rapid expansion of LFPs in the Indian city of
Hyderabad has been linked to government schools’ low quality and
their inability to meet parental demand (Tooley et al., 2007, Dixon
and Gomathi 2007). The government of Bhutan also encourages
private schools to reach hard to access populations (Kitaev, 2004).
But does the expansion in private education equate to increased
enrollment overall? Some insight to this answer can be drawn from
the experience of Pakistan. Identifying its role as ‘‘an enabler and
facilitator’’, rather than a sole provider of education, the Govern-
ment of Pakistan (2004, p. 31) has witnessed considerable growth
in the number of private schools since 1993 with 75% of private
school enrollment taking place at the primary level (Andrabi et al.,
2008). At the middle school level the share of private school
enrollment as a percent of overall enrollment exceeded 50% in
2004 (Aslam, 2009). Notwithstanding this expansion in private
school enrollment, the net enrollment rates for Pakistan remain
well below the South Asian regional average as most enrolled
students are males and in urban areas (Andrabi et al., 2008).
Recent evidence from Africa also suggests that even suppos-
edly ‘low-fee’ private schools attract only the wealthier among the
poor. For example, Omega Schools, a private for-proﬁt ‘high-
volume, low-margin’ school chain in Ghana supported by
multinational investors has cut costs by hiring un-unionized
teachers possessing only high school diplomas and paying them
less than one ﬁfth the average wage of public school teachers
while maintaining high pupil-teacher ratios sometimes in excess
of ﬁfty to one (Riep, 2015). Despite perceptions that Omega
Schools might expand access to those currently out-of-school,
independent researchers argue its daily fee payment system is
neither ‘low-fee’ nor ‘affordable’ for the most economically
disadvantaged (Riep, 2015). Most importantly, the chain appears
to only absorb children who were previously attending other
schools with Riep’s (2015) study ﬁnding, ‘‘436 out of 437 students
questioned said they had already been enrolled in classes at
another school prior to Omega. Only 1 out of 437 had not. This
ﬁnding refutes any suggestion that Omega Schools are signiﬁ-
cantly extending initial access to basic education’’ (p. 19). Findings
like these indicating that private institutions are not necessarily
committed to UBE are perhaps not surprising, given that private
self-ﬁnancing schools cannot be run at a price point accessible to
impoverished households.
These experiences are also corroborated by a rigorous literature
review on private schooling completed by the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development (DFID) (Ashley et al.,
2014). In their review of 59 studies, DFID concluded that private
schools in developing countries are clustered in urban areas,
disproportionately attended by boys, and inaccessible to low-
income families. Moreover, ‘‘ﬁnancial constraints’’ are ‘‘a key factor
limiting or preventing poorer households enrolling their children
in private schools’’ (p. 28), and since these schools are not
ﬁnancially sustainable they are vulnerable to quickly closing down.
Such results raise doubts over whether the poorest and most
marginalized (including rural and indigenous populations,
females, and those with disabilities) will be able to access and
complete a private school education. Too often school access is
limited by costs, raising questions on the affordability of private
education for the poorest families. Although Tooley and Dixon
(2006) suggest that LFPs can provide scholarships or reserve
concessional spaces for the poorest families and Tooley et al.
(2007) found evidence of fee reductions given at LFPs in
Hyderabad, India, Ha¨rma¨’s (2009) research elsewhere in India
found this is not always the case. When she interviewed parents
about potential scholarships for poor children, the claim that they
provide meaningful access was quickly dismissed. The implication
is that although LFPs may practice various forms of ‘‘fee
bargaining’’ (Srivastava, 2007) to gain market share, concessional
spaces at LFPs may be insufﬁcient to achieve UBE (Ha¨rma¨, 2011)
because in general private schools avoid those students that are too
costly or hard to reach (Lewin, 2007; Lincove, 2007).
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In fact, throughout Asia and Africa, studies repeatedly ﬁnd the
majority of private schools including LFPs are concentrated in
urban areas (Andrabi et al., 2008; Ashley et al., 2014; Lincove,
2007; Mok et al., 2009; Tooley and Dixon, 2006; Woodhead et al.,
2013). According to one study, the supply of LFPs in Pakistan is
largely determined by the availability of inexpensive, educated
female teachers (permitting LFP schools to keep expenditures low),
thus limiting potential geographic locations where LFPs may take
root in contrast to research suggesting that private school supply
is driven by demand (Andrabi et al., 2008). Within India, LFPs have
also served some populations more than others featuring higher
enrollment of males and high caste Hindus and under-representa-
tion of low-castes, Muslims, and females (Ha¨rma¨, 2009).
However, the biggest limitation of LFPs as a means to achieve
UBE appears to be that even the least expensive private schools are
often cost prohibitive for the poor (Ashley et al., 2014). In other
words, they are actually ‘‘medium price’’ rather than ‘‘low price’’ to
the poor. For the poorest families in India, LFPs cost 15% (Tooley,
2007) to 20% (Ha¨rma¨, 2009) of their monthly earnings per child.
This ﬁnding is similar to Chimombo’s (2009) study of Malawi
where households at the poverty line spend 30% of their income
just to send one child to the cheapest private school and studies in
Nigeria which ﬁnd the costs of LFP schools limit access to the top
two income quintiles (Lincove, 2007). In addition, a recent report
by Action Aid International and in-country partners in Kenya and
Uganda (ActionAid International et al., 2015) found that enrolling
their children in the ‘‘low-fee’’ chain Bridge International cost
families in the bottom quintile between 25% and 75% of their
monthly income. Although the concept of affordability may be
challenging to interpret given the ‘‘sacriﬁce mentality’’ adopted by
many families which reprioritize educational needs over house-
hold needs such as food and clothing (Srivastava, 2006), it is clear
that, especially in poor families with multiple school age children,
private schools are not a realistic option (ActionAid International
et al., 2015). Moreover, the ﬁnancial access gap appears to be
expanding in some countries. In comparing two cohorts in India
born in 1994–1995 and 2001–2002, Woodhead et al. (2013) found
an expanding gap in private school access between the poorest
rural families and the least poor, leading them to conclude that ‘‘in
so far as it is unable to offer potential beneﬁts to all children, and
especially those children who may remain outside of formal
schooling or drop-out early, there is little evidence that growth in
the private school sector will make a major positive contribution to
the achievement of EFA goals’’ (p. 73).
Compounded by lack of access to private schools, higher income
parents and education advocates may exit public schools leading to
under-resourced public schools ﬁlled with the most marginalized
students (Smith and Rowland, 2014). When competition increases,
the most vocal advocates from public schools might simply leave
resulting in a decline in public school quality and facilities which
may increase student dropout rates (Arnove et al., 2003; Cox and
Witko, 2010). As the individuals who ﬂee public education to
attend private schools tend to be drawn from the economically
advantaged group, private school expansion may reduce the
middle class tax base, hindering local school ﬁnance (Roemer,
1992). When the middle class exit for private schools, poor
students have no choice but to attend government schools or low
quality private schools creating a bifurcated system with ‘‘an
expensive system for the rich and a poor quality one for the poor’’
(Tilak, 2006, p. 45, see also Bonal, 2004). Several studies have found
this historically to be the case in India where government schools
disproportionately attend to marginalized students in lower
classes (De et al., 2002; Ha¨rma¨, 2011; Vasavi, 2003).
Gender is also an important issue and studies of private school
attendance often observe a preference for sending sons (Ashley
et al., 2014). While in Nigeria and Zambia gender parity in private
school enrollment has been reached or nearly reached (Lincove,
2007), more substantial gaps are found in India (De et al., 2002;
Dre`ze and Sen, 2002; Tooley and Dixon, 2006), Uganda (Lincove,
2007), and Pakistan (Andrabi et al., 2008). In India, the gender
differential is attributed to marriage traditions and dowry burdens
which dictate sons be given preferential access to education (Dre`ze
and Sen, 2002) as reﬂected in a disproportionate dispersion of
family resources to boys (PROBE, 1999).
To fully comprehend which path – public education or a
mixture of signiﬁcant private and public schooling – is most likely
to lead to rapid UBE, we believe it is also important to understand
the upstream ideologies that inﬂuence which path is chosen. To
those who approach UBE from a relatively egalitarian perspective,
basic education is generally considered a public good ‘‘where
beneﬁts are enjoyed by all members of the community, whether or
not they actually contributed to the production of this good’’
(Labaree, 1997, p. 51). Public goods have three deﬁning char-
acteristics: ﬁrst, the good is equally available to everyone, second,
it is impossible to price an individual out of the good, and third, the
good provides beneﬁts for individuals as well as society (Jolly,
2003).
To those who reject egalitarianism in schooling, education may
be conceived of as a private rather than public good and this
involves ‘‘a conceptual shift from education as an intrinsically
valuable shared resource which the state owes to its citizens to a
consumer product for which the individual must take ﬁrst
responsibility’’ (Ball and Youdell, 2007, p. 53). From this
perspective education may be seen as a personal opportunity
(Hill, 2006) as opposed to a human right, and pupils viewed as
clients rather than students (Mok, 1999).
Those who treat education as a private good may not feel it is
necessary for the state to provide schooling. As Tilak (2006) puts it,
wherever private schools ﬂourish, ‘‘the government might not feel
the need for opening new government schools and as a result, the
access of the poor to schools would be seriously affected’’ (p. 45).
When education is treated as a private good it usually increases the
cost burden of schooling (Colclough, 1996), pricing many families
out of participating (Hill et al., 2008; Torche, 2005), and leading to
disproportionate access to school choice opportunities (Lee, 1993;
Levin and Belfeld, 2003).
Joseph Stiglitz (1999) further makes the case that when
education is reduced to a private good, one in which individuals
are only interested in their personal return, basic education will be
undersupplied making UBE impossible. If education is a private
good, reliant on private investment, inequality may abound
because not everyone has the same rate of return on their
education investment (Robeyns, 2006). This would prove to be
especially problematic in countries where social stratiﬁcation is
already rigid and upward mobility opportunities are limited. As a
corrective to this collective action problem, and to ensure supply
equals demand, the state can alternatively act as the primary
provider.
2. Theory and method
Universal basic education has an equalizing effect on society in
that all members go through the same number of years of formal
schooling. This basic equalizing effect is present even if the quality
of instruction differs across and within schools. Because UBE is a
move toward some degree of basic equality, its success and speed
of achievement will be contingent upon the extent to which policy-
makers and implementers (i.e. political and social elites) favor
social equality. In our view there are two ideal-typical poles under
which this can be pursued as shown in Fig. 1.
Because of the upstream ideological difference which motivates
a public education approach to UBE as opposed to a mix of private
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and public sector schooling, we can anticipate that predominantly
public education systems will have an edge over more privatized
systems of basic education when it comes to (a) school completion
rates, (b) gender parity, and (c) pupils continuing their studies into
upper secondary and tertiary education. As described below, in our
view the world’s two largest developing countries illustrate both of
these pathways: China has taken the more egalitarian route while
India has applied a more in-egalitarian approach.
China and India are also crucial cases for UBE because together
they make up as much as 45% of the world’s primary school-aged
children and 35% of the world’s population (Population Reference
Bureau., 2013; Rao et al., 2003). In both countries, primary school
enrollment rates were similar in the mid-twentieth century
(Ahmed et al., 1991). In 1949, China had 24 million students
and in 1951, India had 19 million students, but ‘‘by 1997, net
enrolment ratios for primary education were 99 per cent for China
and 71 per cent for India’’ (Rao et al., 2003, p. 156). In the twenty-
ﬁrst century, India is still behind China with higher dropout rates
and lower attendance and graduation rates for basic education
such that as of 2009, only four Indian states were close to UBE
(Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Mizoram, Tamil Nadu) (Mehrotra,
2012).
To better understand the UBE divergence between India and
China we used a ‘‘structured, focused comparison’’ approach. This
approach asks standardized questions of selected cases over a
historical period of interest while focusing solely on information
relevant to the research objectives (George and Bennett, 2005).
This allows us to analyze divergences between two countries with
similarly large populations, the majority of whom live in rural
areas. While our qualitative comparative case study is descriptive
in nature (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014), it has the advantage of
illustrating two different pathways to UBE whereby China has
pursued a predominantly public school based approach to
universalizing basic education while India has relied more heavily
on the private sector.3
In our view, the experience of China falls closer to the
egalitarian model, a model inﬂuenced by the expansion of basic
education in two of its neighbors: the Soviet Union and Japan
(Pepper, 1990; Vickers., 2009a). Though elementary school quality
across China is not and has never been equal, the Chinese system as
a whole since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power
in 1949 has been motivated by the egalitarian ideology of
communism (Burris, 1990). By contrast, India has attempted to
follow an in-egalitarian path to UBE as neither the Indian National
Congress (INC) nor the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the country’s
two most prominent ruling political parties, have promoted a
strong degree of ideological egalitarianism to counter traditionally
widely held in-egalitarian attitudes with the state of Kerala being a
major exception (Joshi and Yu, 2014; Joshi and McGrath, 2015).
Whereas some believe an in-egalitarian route based on a mixture
of public, private, and non-proﬁt schooling is an equally plausible
and alternative route to UBE, our theoretical expectation is that
this route will be slower and less likely to succeed than an
egalitarian approach which emphasizes public schooling. This is
because UBE requires not only educating ninety percent of
children, but also educating the last ten percent. The last ten
percent typically live in areas that are not proﬁtable, hard to reach,
and costly to cover. The public sector will most likely have to cover
these children if they are to be covered at all, but in a stratiﬁed
system under which an in-egalitarian ideology remains dominant,
there may not be commensurate motivation on the part of the state
to cover the last ten percent (Carnoy and Samoff, 1990).
3. Comparative case studies
3.1. The case of China – Public sector route to basic education
China’s efforts to universalize basic education have focused on
public schools. Since the 1949 victory of the Communists in the
Chinese civil war, ‘‘Chinese planners have always been concerned
about how to build a strong, uniﬁed and prosperous nation’’
(Murphy and Johnson, 2009, p. 450). From 1949 to 1960 Soviet
inﬂuence was strong in shaping China’s education system and,
unlike India, China relied heavily on centralized ﬁnancing of
education in the early years (Pepper, 1990). Private schooling at the
elementary level was virtually eliminated and state promotion of
compulsory primary education and mass literacy campaigns
spread education to a wide portion of society starting in the early
1950s (Peterson, 1997). Curriculum was highly standardized and
the People’s Education Press (PEP) was the sole agency responsible
for curriculum design and textbook production (Adamson, 2004).
Though emphasis within basic education oscillated between
meritocracy and exam-based performance (‘expert’), as opposed
to class background and ideological commitment to communism
(‘red’), both camps focused on public schooling as the means to
achieve their goals. As shown in Fig. 2, mass expansion of primary
schooling took off more quickly in China than in India during its
ﬁrst ﬁfteen years, the same time window as the MDGs, with
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 Downstream  
Factors
1. Egalitar ian 
Model 
2. In- egalitari an 
Model 
Egalita rian 
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Unif orm Scho ol 
System  of similar 
quality  schoo ls 
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ideology 
motivates  
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among social 
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Fig. 1. Egalitarian and in-egalitarian approaches to universal basic education.
3 We ecognize that in these large countries there are subnational differences in
the proliferation of private schools. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, we
believe further research should look into this.
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Chinese net school enrollment climbing rapidly from 25% to 62%
from 1949 to 1957 (Acharya et al., 2001).
When China later embarked on its Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (GPCR) (1966–1976), emphasis shifted toward expand-
ing basic education in the rural areas and decentralizing school
management. Although many urban schools were shut down
during the early years of the GPCR, the number of rural elementary
and lower secondary schools increased dramatically as did the
number of rural teachers, many of whom were urban dwellers
assigned to teach in the countryside. As a result within a decade
‘‘the annual number of senior middle school graduates increased
from less than 300,000 to well over 6,000,000’’ (Andreas, 2009, p.
207). Although private sector for-proﬁt schooling was banned,
non-proﬁt public schools administered by local commune
governments known as minban4 schools ﬂourished during this
time. Whereas in 1946, China had 289,000 primary schools
enrolling 23.7 million students, by 1983, there were 862,165
primary schools and net enrollment had reached 94% of primary
school-age children (MoE, 1985).
After the Cultural Revolution, China retained its emphasis on
public schools as the predominant provider of basic education, but
returned to centralization and standardization in school adminis-
tration. The reconstructed system ‘‘included ‘regular’ systems for
everything: a preoccupation with ﬁxed, uniform standards;
concentration of resources in a few elite schools; school closures
to promote quality; relegating ‘irregular’ solutions to a separate
status’’ (Pepper, 1990, p. 71). A fair number of rural schools were
also shut down at the end of the GPCR as education resources were
reallocated to urban areas and tertiary education. In the country-
side, the focus of education shifted away from learning skills used
in rural society to preparing for exams. In 1986, the Compulsory
Education Law was introduced with the aim of eliminating child
labor under the age of 15 and universalizing nine years of basic
education by the end of the century.
As school attendance continued to rise in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the state reduced education funding to rural schools to
concentrate funding in ‘‘keypoint’’ (zhongdian) schools for top
students as well as senior secondary and technical education
(Pepper, 1990). As a result, townships were authorized to collect an
educational surtax on agricultural and township enterprises and
schools were permitted to charge miscellaneous fees to students.
As Chinese public ﬁnance became more decentralized, wealthier
areas were able to cover the cost of their localities’ education while
poorer areas were forced to hunt for funds and charge additional
fees (Li and Bai, 2005). In contrast to India, where public ﬁnancing
of privately managed schools is common, many parts of China
witnessed an increase in private ﬁnancing of publicly managed
schools.
Despite growing regional inequalities, China was able to make
substantial progress in universalizing compulsory education and
eliminating illiteracy which it had nearly completed as of 2011
(UNESCO, 2012; World Bank, 2013). In addition to public
schooling, government literacy campaigns were known as one
of the ‘‘two basics’’ (liang ge jiben) at the heart of educational
expansion in China. A focus on standardization also led to merging
all provincial education systems into a uniﬁed system with six
years of primary school (xiaoxue), three years of lower secondary
school (chuzhong), and three years of upper secondary school
(gaozhong). China also maintained a highly centralized system of
curriculum development in the post-GPCR period (Vickers, 2009b).
As China has shifted away from communism toward a capitalist
economy, however, the introduction of marketization and
privatization across the Chinese economy has made its presence
felt in the education sector (Mok et al., 2009)5. While radical
egalitarianism has been shelved, education has remained impor-
tant to achieving the goals of the ‘‘four modernizations’’ of
agriculture, industry, defense, and science/technology. More
recent ideological pronouncements to construct a socialist
‘‘harmonious society’’ have likewise encouraged and legitimated
educational expansion to improve the ‘‘quality’’ (suzhi) of China’s
population (Joshi, 2012). Meanwhile neoliberalism has cropped up
in China in the form of school choice and choice fees especially at
the high school level and in feeder schools into ‘‘keypoint’’ schools
(Wu, 2012, 2008). However, choice fees are limited mainly to
choices among public schools in China, whereas choice fees end up
in the hands of the private sector in India. Private schooling is now
permitted at the primary and secondary level in China, but few
Chinese students attend private schools.
Why was China relatively successful in rapidly universalizing
basic education? First, ‘‘China underwent a political and social
revolution that marked a sharp break from the past’’ whereby
primary education was prioritized as crucial to ideological
dissemination and national development (Rao et al., 2003, p.
159). Second, owing to the regime’s egalitarian ideology, the
implementation of education policy was taken seriously with
considerable ‘‘stress on precise implementation of State guide-
lines’’ (ibid, p. 164). Third, reformers in China believed schooling
was necessary for ‘‘the moral transformation’’ of each individual
in society and identifying ‘‘rencai (‘talented men’)’’ who could
serve the state bureaucracy and modernize the economy
(Vickers., 2009a, p. 592, 593)6. Fourth, the state has taken serious
measures to prevent teacher absenteeism and student drop outs.
Fig. 2. Number of primary schools (per 1000 children) in China and India (1950–
1965). Data sources: MoE (1985, p. 21), Guo (2008, p. 201), UNDESA (2011), NSB
(2012), Table 20–Table 205. Note: In 1965 the number of schools in China reported
by MoE (1985) was actually higher than displayed here. As that ﬁgure is likely a
typo, we calculated the 1965 data point as the average of the number of schools in
1964 and 1966. ‘‘Children’’ refers to the population group between ages 5 and 14.
4 As Ding (2012, pp. 41–42) points out, a minban school prior to 1980 referred to
‘‘a common collective investment by everyone in a village: everyone enjoyed the
right to enter the school and also the obligation to support it." In contrast to private
schools which are sponsored by non-governmental organizations and individuals,
‘‘minban schools were more like collective enterprises in terms of sponsorship—that
is, they were collectively sponsored by the neighborhood." Since the 1980s, when
China’s original minban schools were phased out and replaced by centrally
administered government schools, the meaning of the term minban has since
shifted in general usage towards a synonym for private education.
5 Prior to the 1980s, China relied heavily on minban schools in rural areas which
were state schools largely staffed by volunteers and community members paid low
wages in cash or kind which was very income regressive since it did not happen in
urban areas where teachers were on the state payroll. That system largely collapsed
with economic growth and too many cases of non-payment and underperformance.
6 Although China is linguistically and culturally more homogeneous than India, it
has substantial national minorities some of whom may regard public schooling as
assimilationist.
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‘‘In China, teachers and schools see it as their responsibility to bring
dropouts back to school. Efforts are also made to address student-
speciﬁc causes of dropping out’’ (Rao et al., 2003, p. 164). If
students are not attending school, the state can and will prosecute
the parents for disobeying the law.
3.2. The case of India – Large private sector in basic education
Over the last six decades, India has chosen a mixed approach to
achieving basic education involving a fairly large role for privately
managed schools including both publicly funded ‘‘private aided’’
schools and privately funded ‘‘private unaided’’ schools. Article
45 of India’s 1950 Constitution bound the country ‘‘to provide,
within a period of ten years from the commencement of this
Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children
until they complete the age of fourteen years.’’ However, the same
document also made education a responsibility of state govern-
ments rather than the central government. As a result, ﬁnancing,
curriculum development, and the administration of education
were decentralized. From the early years, funding of education
differed signiﬁcantly across Indian states. Reﬂecting the absence of
national standards, the number of years a student was required to
spend in primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary also
varied by state.
In contrast to China, from the 1950s to the 1970s, basic
education was not a major priority for the government of India,
which was more concerned with investing in higher education and
the development of world-class technology institutes (Mehrotra,
2004; Weiner, 1991). Unlike the egalitarian communist economic
model and political authoritarianism under a single political party
pursued by China, India opted for an electoral democracy alongside
gradualist Fabian socialism which prioritized urban industrializa-
tion over basic investments in rural education, health, agriculture,
and infrastructure (Acharya et al., 2003; Lal, 1995). As a result the
inﬂuence of traditional patriarchal and caste-based hierarchies
remained strong in the countryside where most of the population
lived (Kohli, 1987). However, the mood of the country began to
gradually shift in the 1970s. The 1966 Kothari Commission had
criticized India’s failure to implement compulsory education
leading, in 1976, to India’s 42nd Constitutional Amendment which
brought education into the ‘‘Concurrent List’’, making it a shared
responsibility of both the central and state governments. This shift
would increase the amount of public funding available for
education, but did not absolve the great disparities across regions
or the large role of the private sector in schooling, especially in
urban areas.
Recognizing the need for more public investment in facilities
and teacher training, the Government of India followed its
1986 National Education Policy with investments in a variety of
schemes including Operation Blackboard (from 1987) and the
National Literacy Mission (from 1990) (Radhakrishnan, 2001;
Tilak, 2001). New school construction subsequently reduced the
distance between children’s homes and their schools by placing
primary schools directly in many villages7 and in 1995, a national-
level ‘‘mid-day meal’’ (MDM) program was adopted to help
improve overall school enrollment, attendance, and nutrition of
primary school children, although results have varied signiﬁcantly
across the states (Dre`ze and Goyal, 2003; Rutledge, 2012).
Despite these measures, an assessment of India’s government
progress on compulsory education at the turn of the century
observed,
Achieving universal elementary education within 10 years was
included . . . in the Constitution of the Indian Republic. The
rhetoric continues but the goal remains elusive even after
50 years of planning. Governments, both at the centre and in the
states, irrespective of their ideology, have not pursued this
objective seriously and with vigour. Resources allocated to
education have been woefully inadequate and, with higher
education absorbing a rising proportion of allocations, elemen-
tary education has remained on a semi-starvation diet. The idea
of making elementary education legally compulsory for all
children has not evoked much enthusiasm. Some states have
enacted the necessary legislation but none has exerted itself to
get the law enforced (Vaidyanthan and Nair, 2001, p. 23).
Five decades after India’s independence, there were still no
reported cases of parents ﬁned or penalized for not sending their
children to school, and it was widely believed that ofﬁcial statistics
underestimated India’s child laborers and ‘‘nowhere children’’
(which combined accounted for almost one third of all children
aged 6–14), many of whom were female, who neither attend
school nor engage in recorded labor activities (Jayaraj and
Subramanian, 2005).
Despite India’s slower progress in UBE compared to China, after
its 1991 ﬁnancial liberalization reforms it developed a District
Primary Education Program (DPEP) utilizing foreign aid to promote
primary education, devolving funds to district education planning
committees, and monitoring primary and secondary education
through the District Information System on Education (DISE)
program (Colclough and De, 2010; Dyer, 2005). Although India’s
neoliberal turn in 1991 was twelve years after China’s neoliberal
turn in 1979, it is important to realize that India has received only
limited international aid. In fact, since 1997 net aid transfers to
India have been negative as repayment costs have exceeded the
value of new aid received (Colclough and De, 2010). In both China
and India, educational development has not been heavily driven by
foreign aid.
At the start of the new millennium, India’s national ‘‘movement
to educate all’’ (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan) (SSA) coincided with the
launching of the MDGs to increase resources to universalize basic
education. The SSA program has succeeded in expanding the
number of schools, hiring new teachers, and increasing student
enrollment prompting some optimism, but critics argue its
management on the ground has often been weak and the quality
of schools and teaching has not been very high with continued high
levels of student dropouts, teacher absenteeism, unutilized funds,
and low quality teaching (Aiyar et al., 2009; Rogers and Vegas,
2009). The combination of minimal public investment in basic
education and low quality government schooling often leads to
parental exit, as those who can afford it ﬂee to private schools,
including ‘‘low-fee’’ private schools (De et al., 2002; Mehrotra,
2012; Ohara, 2012; PROBE, 1999; Srivastava, 2014; Tooley et al.,
2007). However, ‘‘low-fee’’ private schools do not necessarily
perform better than their public school counterparts (Chudgar and
Quin, 2012) and research conducted by Ha¨rma¨ (2009) found that
‘‘while LFPs are greatly preferred under current conditions, what
parents actually want is a well-functioning government school
system’’ (p. 151).
The private sector plays a major role in basic education in India
with the World Bank ﬁnding that ‘‘about 40 percent of urban
primary schools and more than half of all secondary schools in
1987 were private’’ (Guo, 2008, p. 207). As shown in Fig. 3, the
trend over the past three decades in India has been toward
increasing growth of private schools, especially private un-aided
schools which increased from 1.6% to 8.6% of primary schools and
from 4.7% to 16.1% of upper primary schools (grades 6–8) between
1978–79 and 2009–10 (MHRD, 2014b). Private-unaided schools
7 Unlike China, there has been less emphasis in India on getting children from
rural areas to attend boarding schools for the delivery of elementary education. In
India, this is more common in secondary schooling.
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exceed private-aided schools at all levels as shown in Fig. 4. In
2011–12, 11.2% of all primary schools were private (3% aided, 8.2%
unaided), 26.4% of all upper primary schools were private (9.5%
aided, 16.9% unaided), 59.4% of all secondary/high schools were
private (21.8% aided, 37.6% unaided), and 66.1% of all junior
colleges/intermediate schools were private (25.8% aided, 40.3%
unaided) (MHRD, 2014c). As shown in Fig. 5, UNESCO (2012)
estimates that 17% of primary school students, 42% of total
secondary school students (both lower and upper secondary), and
the majority (55%) of upper secondary school students in India are
in private-aided or private-unaided schools. The contrast with
China is signiﬁcant.
Thus far, India has eschewed a common school system (Jha and
Parvati, 2010; Mehrotra, 2012), but some argue that India’s
2009 Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE)
now represents a change in favor of public education by requiring
all un-registered LFP schools to close within three years. The Act
also requires private unaided schools to reserve at least 25% of
school places for economically disadvantaged children with these
costs to be reimbursed by the state (Ashley, 2012; Srivastava and
Noronha, 2014). While this may expand access, it will not likely
be enough to prevent dropouts from groups like street children,
the very poor, girls from large families, and rural students from
the lowest castes and scheduled tribes. As one study argues ‘‘the
government seems to be in no hurry to adhere to the spirit of
the right to education going by the number of disclaimers that
are provided’’ and ‘‘the union government’s attempt to shy away
from taking primary ﬁnancial responsibility of implementing the
act is in keeping with its reluctance to allocate adequately for
the social sector’’ (Jha and Parvati, 2010, p. 22). While the
Government of India will be able to prosecute those running an
un-recognized school, based on past experience it seems unlikely
prosecutions will occur (Jha and Parvati, 2010). Thus, by not taking
major steps to replace private schools with government ones,
private schooling is likely to retain its place as a major player in
Indian elementary education.
4. Results: Comparing China and India
4.1. School attendance and graduation
As discussed above, China has emphasized public schooling and
expanded school attendance and graduation at a faster rate than
India where private schools are common. From 1964 to 1982,
average years of schooling in China jumped from 3.2 to 5 and from
1982 to 2000 this rose to 7.7, compared to only 4.4 mean years of
schooling in India in the early 2000s (Li and Bai, 2005; Tilak, 2006).
Chinese school enrolment rates and grade-for-age attainment
also demonstrated improvement during the 1990s (Adams and
Hannum, 2005) and China experienced a substantial decrease in
the rural–urban gap, inter-regional disparities, and overall
inequality in per student expenditures due to re-centralization
efforts in the 2000s including the Rural Primary School Merger
Program (Mo et al., 2012; Zhao, 2009). Although comparable net
enrollment data for the two countries is unavailable, Fig. 6 reveals
the much higher primary school gross enrollment in China over
the period from 1970 to the present. Whereas Chinese gross
Fig. 3. Private schools as percent of all primary schools in India. Data source: MHRD
(2014b).
Fig. 4. Private schools as percent of all schools in India by level (2011–2012). Data
source: MHRD (2014c).
Fig. 5. Private school students (as % of Total Students) in China and India (2010).
Data sources: UNESCO (2012) and World Bank (2013). Note: Secondary schooling
includes both lower and upper secondary schools. UNESCO and the World Bank do
not provide separate data on lower secondary schools.
Fig. 6. Primary school gross enrollment ratio (1971–2008). Data source: World Bank
(2013).
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enrollment has been over 100% since the 1970s, India only reached
this level much later in the mid-2000s.
As shown in Table 1, by 2009, China had a 96% survival rate to
grade 4 compared to 70% in India. With a youth illiteracy rate
below 1%, only about 1 million Chinese youths were illiterate
compared to over 41 million in India where the youth illiteracy rate
was 19% (UNESCO, 2012)8. It must also be remembered that these
results are not an artifact of China currently being a richer country
than India as much of the increase in Chinese enrollment happened
prior to the 1980s. In fact, secondary school enrollment in China
increased from 14 million to 68 million from 1965 to 1978 (Pepper,
1990) and in 1981, almost one out of ﬁve people (18%) had
completed middle school (chuzhong) (i.e. upper primary school) in
China compared to only one out of twenty-ﬁve (4%) in India
(Bhalla, 1992) even though Indian per capita income was higher
than in China prior to 1985.
4.2. Gender parity
As with school enrollment, China has come closer to achieving
gender parity in education than India (Joshi, 2015). Toward the end
of the Cultural Revolution school attendance rates in China were
around 95% for both boys and girls (MoE, 1985; Pepper, 1990) and
since the 1970s, girls’ gross primary school enrollment ratio has
consistently been over 100. As shown in Fig. 7, India took about
35 years longer to reach this level of girls’ primary school
enrollment. We must also remember that whereas primary school
completion rates in 2009 were 96% in China they were only 70% in
India, indicating a large number of dropouts, including many
female students.
The narrower gender gap in China reﬂects broader social
transformations that have taken place in China since the middle of
the 20th century. China’s socialist imperative of pursuing
egalitarianism after 1949 extended across both classes and gender,
explaining in large part why public schooling predominates in
China. Likewise, in higher education, women are much more
prevalent in China than in India. Relative success in gender parity
compared to most developing countries is not only due to social
pressure but also conscious efforts of the state in the design of the
education system and in the public school curriculum (Zhao, 2011).
Even in the rural northwest, Chinese parents invest equally in girls’
and boys’ education and mothers frequently express egalitarian
views about girls’ and boys’ education abilities (Hannum et al.,
2009)9. In India, where compulsory education is not enforced by
penalties for non-compliance, parents are more reluctant to put
girls in school, especially secondary school (Siddhu, 2011). As a
result, China has a much higher female literacy rate than India as
shown in Fig. 8.
4.3. Upper secondary and higher education
Whereas India has faced great difﬁculty in curtailing dropouts
from secondary education (Lewin, 2011), in China enrollment and
graduation in secondary schools and higher education exceeds that
of India. Fig. 9 displays the large difference in girls’ enrollment in
secondary school, a gap that presently stands near twenty percent.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that in addition to China having a
much higher tertiary enrollment rate (25.9%) than India (17.9%),
the country sends and receives nearly three times the amount of
higher education students from other countries (Fig. 10).
Table 1
Primary school completion indicators in China and India (2006–2010).
Indicators India China
Survival rate to grade 4 70% (2006) 96% (2009)
Youth literacy rate
(age 15–24)
81.1% (2006) 99.4% (2010)
Youth illiterates 41.27 million (2006) 1.25 million (2010)
Data source: UNESCO (2012).
Fig. 7. Primary school girls’ gross enrollment ratio (1974–2008). Data source: World
Bank (2013).
Fig. 8. Literacy rates in China and India (1951–2011). Data sources: Guo (2008),
UNESCAP (2004) and UNESCO (2012).
Fig. 9. Secondary school girls’ gross enrollment ratio (1974–2008). Data source:
World Bank (2013).
8 One can question these estimates, and it has been argued that school dropout
rates in China likely exceeded the ofﬁcial rate of 1% (Chung & Mason, 2012), but they
were probably still less than the 30% rate in India.
9 In both rural China and India there are areas with many more boys than girls as
a result of sex-selective abortion and infanticide.
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5. Discussion
This paper has compared the predominately public school
model of China with the mixed school model of India, suggesting
that the former is most likely to expedite UBE. The speed at which
China reached a gross primary school enrollment rate of at least
100% contrasts sharply with the slow and segmented expansion in
India. After six decades of declaring the imperative of compulsory
education, India is still shy of achieving UBE. Though it is worth
noting that one of India’s most successful states, Himachal Pradesh,
has succeeded in this endeavor ‘‘almost entirely on government
schools, with relatively little contribution from private institu-
tions’’ (Godbole, 2001, p. 4612). For the country as a whole,
between 25% and 33% of Indian primary school age students did
not complete elementary education as of 2010, whereas in the
same year elementary education was completed by over 95% of
primary school age children in China. Thus, while India is still
dealing with the challenges of universalizing primary education,
China has more or less already ﬁnished this task and has moved on
to the task of universalizing lower secondary education.
As mentioned earlier, China nearly tripled its number of
primary schools between 1950 and 1965 (See ﬁg. 2). This was made
possible by China’s commitment to public ﬁnancing for education.
In the early 1950s, Chinese public education expenditure (2.0% of
GDP) was three times higher than in India (0.6% of GDP) (MoE,
2006; Tilak, 2006). While spending increased over time in India, by
1960 China still spent double the proportion of national income
(3.0%) on public education as India (1.5%) (MoE, 2006; Tilak, 2006).
The government of China also invested more heavily on
elementary education than in India during the 1960s and 1970s.
Even today, India continues to spend less on public schools than
China, and since private schools make up a substantial portion of
the education market, the Indian government may not feel
compelled to increase public expenditure (Tilak, 2006). Results
from China and India thus reinforce prior research ﬁnding a direct
correlation between public elementary education expenditure and
school enrollment (Bing, 2008; Bonal, 2004; Poot, 2000).
China’s early focus on expanding access to basic education also
contrasts with India’s concentration on higher education. China’s
early investments in elementary and lower secondary education
have now established a strong base to the education pyramid,
allowing the government to turn its attention to upper secondary
and higher education. As displayed in Fig. 8, India used to have a
higher share of students enrolled in higher education but due to its
failure to achieve UBE, India has limited the number of individuals
with the requisite education background necessary to advance to
higher levels and thus has fallen behind China.
6. Conclusion
While there may be multiple routes to UBE, our examination of
China and India over the past half-century leads us to believe that a
predominantly public education system, with its prerequisite
public expenditure, will have much greater success in rapidly
implementing UBE. Although the enrollment and attendance gap
in basic education between China and India has narrowed over the
past decade, the time it has taken India to reach such a level is not
compatible with the urgency put forth in the MDGs and other
international education initiatives. Whereas China is close to
completing UBE, primary school attendance in India was only
76.2% in 2012–2013 (MHRD, 2014a).
In conclusion, the presence of a large private school sector at the
primary level may not necessarily prevent UBE, but it may lead to
several decades of delay in implementing UBE. Finally, the
substantial portion of primary and secondary school students
that presently attend private schools in India, in addition to the
continued support of privatization by the government – evident in
the 2009 Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act
and the continued subsidization of private schools – makes us
question whether the delay in reaching UBE will be accompanied
by the entrenchment of unequal access to higher quality schools.
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